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Deeply embedded in the credit union tradition is an ongoing 
search for better ways to understand and serve credit union 
members. Open inquiry, the free ﬂ ow of ideas, and debate are 
essential parts of the true democratic process.
Th e Filene Research Institute is a 501(c)(3) not-for-proﬁ t 
research organization dedicated to scientiﬁ c and thoughtful 
analysis about issues aﬀ ecting the future of consumer ﬁ nance. 
Th rough independent research and innovation programs the 
Institute examines issues vital to the future of credit unions.
Ideas grow through thoughtful and scientiﬁ c analysis of top-
priority consumer, public policy, and credit union competitive 
issues. Researchers are given considerable latitude in their 
exploration and studies of these high-priority issues.
Th e Institute is governed by an Administrative Board made up 
of the credit union industry’s top leaders. Research topics and 
priorities are set by the Research Council, a select group of 
credit union CEOs, and the Filene Research Fellows, a blue 
ribbon panel of academic experts. Innovation programs are 
developed in part by Filene i3, an assembly of credit union 
executives screened for entrepreneurial competencies.
Th e name of the Institute honors Edward A. Filene, the “father 
of the U.S. credit union movement.” Filene was an innovative 
leader who relied on insightful research and analysis when 
encouraging credit union development.
Since its founding in 1989, the Institute has worked with over 
one hundred academic institutions and published hundreds of 
research studies. Th e entire research library is available online at 
www.ﬁ lene.org.
Filene Research Institute
Progress is the constant 
replacing of the best there is 
with something still better!
— Edward A. Filene
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Executive Summary and Commentary
By George A. Hofheimer,
Chief Research Oﬃ  cer
Millions of lives were dramatically changed by Hurricane Katrina, 
the worst natural disaster in U.S. history. Numerous businesses were 
wiped out. People lost their homes, their livelihoods, their lives. 
Nearly two years after Katrina, some sectors of the aﬀ ected region 
have proved to be more resilient than others. Th rough the able data 
collection and analysis of Mark Klinedinst, an economics profes-
sor at the University of Southern Mississippi, this report examines 
the plight of credit unions in the face of this disaster. Klinedinst 
compares credit unions with banks in southern Mississippi and in 
New Orleans at both the aggregate and case study levels. Klinedinst 
argues that analyzing credit unions under this kind of duress may be 
useful in identifying cooperative strengths and weaknesses that are 
not apparent under normal circumstances. Th ese ﬁ ndings may assist 
credit unions with larger contingency planning as it relates to disaster 
preparedness.
What Did the Researcher Discover?
Since Katrina struck, banks and credit unions have generally recov-
ered and even thrived, partly due to the large increase in assets in the 
aﬀ ected areas, but mainly due to the hard work of employees and 
members and countless volunteer hours. It is important to note that 
the bank and credit union comeback is not evenly distributed. Kline-
dinst conducts a variety of statistical regressions and discovers that 
the greatest predictors of institutional recovery are size (bigger is bet-
ter) and location (Mississippi is more favorable than New Orleans). 
For example, Klinedinst reports the following ﬁ ndings from the 
period between May 2005 and May 2006:
Sixteen credit unions ceased operations (merged into other 
institutions). Almost all of these credit unions were in the New 
Orleans area.
Th e number of bank employees increased by 9.8%, while the 
number of credit union employees decreased by 4.1%. Once 
again, a good deal of the credit union decrease occurred in and 
around New Orleans.
Th e combined assets of credit unions and banks in the aﬀ ected 
area increased by 27.6%.
Return on assets increased 107.4% for Mississippi credit unions 
and 162% for Mississippi  low- income credit unions, compared to 
only 8.8% for Mississippi banks.
Return on assets increased 22.3% for New Orleans banks but 
decreased by 164.1% for New Orleans  low- income credit unions 
and 107.6% for New Orleans credit unions.
•
•
•
•
•
In addition to the hard numbers, we learn through interviews on 
the ground that credit unions received quite a bit of assistance from 
other credit unions, nongovernment local organizations, and national 
credit union associations. Th e evidence indicates that banks mainly 
received nongovernment assistance from other branches of the same 
institution that were not heavily impacted by the storm, but not 
from other banking institutions. Th e social network of credit unions, 
then, seems to be at least partially responsible for their comeback, 
as represented by a 2.3% increase in credit union membership in 
the aﬀ ected areas of southern Mississippi and New Orleans between 
May 2005 and May 2006.
Practical Implications
Credit unions and banks suﬀ ered enormously from physical dam-
age, the loss of surrounding businesses, and employee personal losses 
caused by Hurricane Katrina. Institutions in New Orleans have a 
particularly hard road ahead, given the extent of the damage and 
the uncertainty surrounding the rebuilding plans. Unﬁ nished local 
infrastructure, higher insurance rates, and building costs all represent 
hurdles to businesses and homeowners in both southern Mississippi 
and New Orleans.
Th is research is a small but signiﬁ cant contribution to the literature 
on organizational resilience in the wake of huge external disasters. 
While some of the key lessons learned from this catastrophe involve 
contingency planning and emergency operations, one of the most 
practical lessons credit unions can take away from this study has to 
do with understanding the potential strength of their cooperative 
structure in the face of  wild- card, external events like hurricanes and 
terrorist attacks. Credit unions have the opportunity to learn from 
past experiences and apply these lessons going forward. (See the side-
bar for a brief overview of eﬀ ective disaster planning practices.)
Source: CUNA Mutual Group. 
ELEMENTS OF GOOD DISASTER
PLANNING
Develop a plan based on various loss 
scenarios.
Keep the plan up to date.
Conduct practice drills.
Ensure all data processing systems are 
backed up.
•
•
•
•
x
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction to the Worst Natural 
Disaster in U.S. History
Hurricane Katrina hit the Gulf Coast in 
August 2005, causing the  worst- ever disaster 
in the United States in terms of total economic 
damages.
2It was a sad time. I pray for those hundreds of mothers who to this 
day have not found their children.
—A usually happy and conﬁ dent teacher,
quoted on June 22, 2006, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi.
Hurricane Katrina bore down on Louisiana and Mississippi with 
a power that was unexpected by many. Th e size of the storm 
brought devastation far inland across several states. Th e death 
toll stood at 1,810 as of August 2006 (Louisiana Department 
of Health and Hospitals 2006).1 Although not the worst U.S. 
disaster in terms of the number of deaths, it is the worst in terms 
of total economic damages: Conservative estimates of insured 
damage are $45 billion (B), compared with approximately $21B 
for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks (Insurance Informa-
tion Institute 2006), and federal government assistance through 
2008 was at least $90B (U.S. Congressional Budget Oﬃ  ce 2006). 
Th is report seeks to determine which ﬁ rms have shown the most 
resilience in the face of this tremendous devastation.
Th e literature on participative ﬁ rms often suggests that ﬁ rms with 
more participation are stronger along a number of dimensions, even 
more so if they are part of a network that ﬁ lls the role of a “support-
ing structure.”2 Having lived through this disaster myself, I have 
heard a number of anecdotes that seem to support this hypothesis of 
cooperative ﬁ rms being able to come back after hard times. In this 
report I try to put some hard numbers behind the various rebuilding 
experiences of ﬁ rms and root out what may be a hidden source of 
strength. Credit unions may ﬁ nd these experiences helpful in devel-
oping or evaluating their disaster preparedness or contingency plans.
1 The death toll is quite controversial. As with other natural disasters (e.g., the 1906 San Francisco earthquake), business and community 
leaders might want to keep the death toll low, and underreporting may occur. For example, a number of patients who died in hospitals that 
lost power were not counted as storm victims.
2 For example, see Klinedinst and Rock 1993, and also Wright 1991, written by the cofounder and manager of North Carolina’s  Self- Help Credit Union.
3Hurricane Katrina’s main impact was felt in the New Orleans area 
and the coastal region of Mississippi. Th e number of businesses in 
the most severely hit areas was about 22,000. More than 350,000 
homes were destroyed, and 137,000 had major structural dam-
age (EconSouth 2005). In Louisiana alone, 1.1 million buildings 
were without power (Brinkley 2006, 386). Th e number of people 
who ﬂ ed, conservatively estimated at 1.36 million (DeParle 2005), 
qualiﬁ es this as the largest diaspora in American history, with the 
possible exception of the Civil War. Many people moved to nearby 
cities where housing could be found. Hence, some cities close to 
the disaster area, such as Baton Rouge and Hattiesburg, saw dra-
matic increases in population.3 Th ese migrations to areas that were 
themselves impacted by the storm (e.g., winds in Hattiesburg were 
recorded at over 130 mph, or 208 kph) complicate the analysis of 
ﬁ rms in the aﬄ  icted areas. Small regional variations could mean a 
dramatic diﬀ erence in the extent of damage and the restoration of 
basic services and infrastructure. In order to control for these diverse 
factors and for the lack of reliable data covering the entire impacted 
area, I limit the focus of this report to the coastal areas of Missis-
sippi and the city of New Orleans. While there are many diﬀ erent 
types of cooperatives in these areas (e.g., electric, worker, farmer, 
Chapter 1
Th e physical destruction inﬂ icted by Katrina was overwhelming.
3 A similar migration occurred after the 1900 hurricane in Galveston, Texas. Galveston was the largest city in Texas before the storm; after the 
storm, nearby Houston grew dramatically.
4and credit unions), this report focuses on credit unions and their 
traditional counterparts, commercial banks.
Th e next chapter looks at theories of ﬁ rm resilience. Chapter 3 
presents the data and discusses the results. Chapter 4 discusses policy 
implications and future research.
CHAPTER 2
Theories on Resilience in the Corporate 
and Cooperative Literature
A number of diﬀ erent measures can be used 
to gauge the strength of a comeback following 
a disaster. Organizations that are part of a 
network and have internal cohesion are more 
likely to stage a strong comeback after a disaster 
like Hurricane Katrina.
6Corporate success has been the subject of numerous studies and 
analyses, with topics ranging from internal dynamics such as leader-
ship, teamwork, and compensation to external macro events that can 
derail the  best- laid plans. Given the magnitude of the disaster that 
Hurricane Katrina was, a number of factors came into play that are 
not often taken into account when considering business survival. Th e 
devastation to infrastructure, employee homes, and local markets 
subjected companies to stresses that many businesses never face. Th e 
sheer magnitude of the damage also had a positive side in that many 
supportive resources were brought in that ﬁ rms normally would not 
have access to. Besides insurance and government funds, private 
philanthropy—estimated at approximately $3B within three months 
of the storm (Lawrence 2006)—played a crucial role. Often this 
support was in kind, which was especially helpful when basic services 
were hard to come by.
Th e value of  in- kind aid is particularly diﬃ  cult to estimate. Not only 
did volunteers come from all over the country to help, but neighbor-
hoods and ﬁ rms also helped one another. Stories of looting, fraud, 
and shootings received a good deal of publicity, but many companies 
and neighborhoods witnessed a tremendous amount of volunteer 
eﬀ ort. Th e statistics on these “random acts of kindness” (sharing food 
and water, helping with repairs, providing housing, etc.) are spotty at 
best, but their eﬀ ects immediately after the storm were real and sig-
niﬁ cant. A number of companies helped out their employees—con-
tinuing to pay wages and providing necessities and housing (Horsley 
2005)—or other individuals and companies in the area.
Th is assistance is often a reﬂ ection of internal ﬁ rm cohesion (Vanek 
1970; Horvat 1979), team atmosphere, and network relations (Hur-
lin 2006; Halary 2006). Organizations that have internal cohesion 
and are part of a supportive network are not only more likely to be 
tougher competitors, but also able to make a comeback after a disaster 
7like Hurricane Katrina. Support organizations (such as the Mississippi 
Credit Union Association, in the case of Katrina) can often provide 
resources to help keep institutions on their feet. A growing literature in 
banking, economics, and other ﬁ elds points to “social capital” as a cru-
cial but often overlooked element of the success of businesses and the 
communities in which they operate.4 Th is social capital infrastructure, 
if properly developed, allows companies with appropriate managerial 
procedures and physical and human capital to be successful and, in the 
 post- Katrina environment, to have a higher degree of resilience.
A number of diﬀ erent measures can be used to gauge the strength of 
a comeback following a disaster. If we let y be the variable gauging 
the ﬁ rm outcome, we can write the following equation:
y = a + b1x1+ . . . + bk xk + e.
Typical dependent variables might be proﬁ ts or return on assets 
(ROA). Th e function described in the equation is a linear relation 
between the variables on the  right- hand side and those on the  left-
 hand side, or the dependent variable. Th e a in the equation is the 
intercept and is typically not of great statistical signiﬁ cance.5 bi (the 
diﬀ erence between b1 and bk ) represents the coeﬃ  cients on either 
control variables (e.g., region, size) or policy variables that may 
impact on the dependent variable. A positive bi indicates a positive 
correlation between the independent variable and y, the dependent 
variable. e is the error term that captures random unexplained inﬂ u-
ences on the dependent variable.
To account for the relatively short period since the storm, to avoid 
complications arising from accounting variability, and to take into 
consideration various ﬁ rm indicators, a number of dependent vari-
ables are used in this report to indicate institutional vitality—e.g., 
asset growth in the  nine- month period following the storm, ROA, 
and assets per employee.6 Th ese measures had to be available for 
both credit unions and banks. Financial institutions, especially credit 
unions, have many ways to gauge success in the short and long 
run, so the measures used here are broad and encompassing. Th e 
Th is social capital infrastructure, if properly developed, allows companies with appropriate 
managerial procedures and physical and human capital to be successful and, in the  post- Katrina 
environment, to have a higher degree of resilience.
4 See, for example, World Bank 2007, Coleman 1988, Becker and Murphy 2000, and Adam et al. 2005.
5 The intercept may be far away from where most of the data are located, and hence a small change in the slope parameters would cause a 
large change in the estimate of the intercept.
6 See, for example, Greer and Rhoades 1977, Lieberman and Asaba 1997, and Park and Weber 2006.
Chapter 2
8 independent variables are factors that might help explain the strength 
of the dependent variables: the age of the institution, size, number 
of employees, location, etc. Both dependent and explanatory vari-
ables were picked not only for their ability to indicate resilience and 
strength, but also because they can be reliably quantiﬁ ed through 
interviews, surveys, and oﬃ  cial reports.
CHAPTER 3
Empirical Results
Banks and credit unions have generally 
recovered and even thrived, partly due to the 
large increase in assets in the aﬀ ected areas, but 
mainly due to the hard work of employees and 
members and countless volunteer hours.
10
Th e total number of credit unions in the area impacted by the storm was 
63—41 in New Orleans and 22 in the 12 Mississippi counties hit hardest 
by the storm.7 Th ere were also 28 banks in the area—13 in New Orleans 
and 15 in southern Mississippi (see Figure 1). By May 31, 2006, almost 
a year later, 16 credit unions no 
longer operated as independent 
institutions in the same area; 
typically they either moved or 
merged. New Orleans credit 
unions saw the biggest drop, with 
a total of 15 fewer credit unions (7 stopped operations or merged, and 
8 moved out of New Orleans). Mississippi lost only one credit union 
during this period, through a merger, but this was already in the works 
prior to the storm, as was the case with some of the New Orleans credit 
unions. Th ese closures are also reﬂ ective of the national trend of credit 
union mergers, with approximately 320 mergers taking place every year.
Th e total number of banks increased by one: A new bank, First NBC 
Bank, opened in New Orleans in May 2006.
By May 31, 2006, almost a year later, 16 credit unions no 
longer operated as independent institutions in the same area; 
typically they either moved or merged.
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Credit unions: sample total 63 47 –25.4
     Mississippi 22 21  –4.5
     New Orleans 41 26 –36.6
Banks: sample total 28 29   3.4
     Mississippi 15 15   0.0
     New Orleans 13 14   7.7
Figure 1: Number of Institutions in Sample
7 The counties in Mississippi were Hancock, Harrison, Jackson, Pearl River, Stone, George, Lamar, Forrest, Perry, Greene, Jones, and Wayne.
11
Th e total number of employees in the sample increased by 8.9%.8 
Banks gained 9.8% more employees while credit unions lost 4.1%, 
with New Orleans credit unions experiencing an 8.5% reduction in 
employees and  low- income credit unions in New Orleans seeing an 
almost 26% reduction in the number of employees. Th e ﬁ gures for 
New Orleans are not too surprising, given that roughly  one- third of 
the city’s jobs were gone almost a year after the storm (EconSouth 
2006). Th e ﬁ gures for banks may be on the high side, since some of 
the banks are quite large and have several oﬃ  ces outside the aﬀ ected 
area.9  Low- income credit unions in Mississippi experienced no 
change in employment.10
Th e combined assets of the institutions in the sample were more than 
$42B in 2005 and grew 27.6% in one year to almost $54B. Banks in 
the sample had a much larger average asset size than credit unions—
about $1.9B, vs. approximately $52.5 million (M) for credit unions, 
which reﬂ ects the national averages of $1.2B for banks and $81M 
for credit unions. Somewhat surprising is the overall strength in asset 
growth of 27.6%. Given the devastation, it seems odd that about nine 
months after the storm, assets were over a quarter higher than they 
were three months before the storm. Banks and credit unions in the 
sample reported similar asset growth of just over 27%. Th e most rea-
sonable explanation for this surge in assets is that the funds coming in 
from insurance claims, government assistance, etc., were available but 
had not yet been used. A number of bank and credit union  oﬃ  cers 
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Credit unions and banks:
sample total
13,118 14,281 8.9
Credit unions: sample total 873 837 –4.1
     Mississippi 685 665 –2.9
     New Orleans 188 172 –8.5
     Mississippi, low income 30 30 0.0
     New Orleans, low income 39 29 –25.6
Banks: sample total 12,245 13,444 9.8
     Mississippi 2,436 2,385 –2.1
     New Orleans 9,809 11,059 12.7
Figure 2: Number of Credit Union and Bank Employees 
 8 Data from this point forward are for banks and credit unions that survived.
 9 Later in the study three of the largest banks were excluded from some statistical analyses as outliers.
10 Low-income credit unions are defi ned as credit unions typically with a criterion where at least 80 percent of the members have incomes 
at or below the median household income. See NCUA Rules and Regulations Section 701.34(a)(2). This infl ux of assets caused hardship on 
some credit unions trying to avoid low net worth ratios; see, for example, NFCDCU 2006.
Chapter 3
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noted that high insurance rates, higher land prices making some 
homeowners sell to developers, and uncertainty as to whether the 
infrastructure and neighborhood would come back have led to large 
deposits being left at ﬁ nancial institutions.  Low- income credit unions, 
as might be expected, have lower asset growth than their counterparts.
Encouragingly, membership in credit unions in the study area grew 
2.3%, to 358,016. Th is increase was largely due to the strength of the 
Mississippi credit unions, since New Orleans credit union member-
ship actually dropped 3.7%. Th is diﬀ erence in membership growth 
rates can be explained in part by the fact that some areas in Missis-
sippi that are on higher ground 
took in refugees from the New 
Orleans area and were quicker 
to rebuild. Th is observation is 
supported by the fact that the 
potential membership base in the Mississippi area grew by 11.6%, 
while the New Orleans potential membership base declined by 9.8%.
Th e largest bank in Louisiana at the time Katrina struck, Hibernia, 
reported that 107 of its 321 branches were impacted by ﬂ ooding or 
storm damage (CUNA 2005a). ATMs were lost all over the storm 
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Credit unions and banks: 
sample total
$42,220,160,825 $53,866,198,457 27.6
Credit unions: sample total $2,020,923,825 $2,572,636,457 27.3
     Mississippi $1,636,170,398 $2,088,736,352 27.7
     New Orleans $384,753,427 $483,900,105 25.8
     Mississippi, low income $36,567,472 $40,291,352 10.2
     New Orleans, low income $43,627,712 $52,711,452 20.8
Banks: sample total $40,199,237,000 $51,293,562,000 27.6
     Mississippi $5,945,826,000 $7,794,418,000 31.1
     New Orleans $34,253,411,000 $43,499,144,000 27.0
Figure 3: Credit Union and Bank Assets
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Sample total 350,096 358,016 2.3
Mississippi 280,253 290,754 3.7
New Orleans 69,843 67,262 –3.7
Mississippi, low income 11,283 11,302 0.17
New Orleans, low income 13,603 13,254 –2.6
Figure 4: Number of Credit Union Members
Encouragingly, membership in credit unions in the study 
area grew 2.3%, to 358,016.
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area. One company reported losing 114 of its 250 bank ATMs 
(CUNA 2005b). Th e average damage reported on surveys was 
$119,200, which is probably about where the median institution 
stood, with quite a number experiencing much greater losses.11 Most 
of the reported aid came from nongovernment sources. As men-
tioned earlier, nongovernment aid, though diﬃ  cult to quantify, was 
substantial—the mean estimates 
reported on the surveys were 
$5,800 and 56.4 volunteer 
hours in the year following 
Katrina. A number of respon-
dents emphasized the importance of setting up emergency support 
prior to a disaster. Th is support can take the form of redundant sys-
tems for hardware and ﬁ nancial resources—e.g.,  walkie- talkies, com-
puters, cell phones, generators, cash, aﬃ  liations or partnerships over 
a wide geographical area, and  oﬀ - site storage of e-mail addresses—as 
well as services for personnel, such as counseling, emergency shelters, 
 ready- to-eat meals, and ﬁ rst aid.
An overall measure of health is ROA, which showed an overall 
decline of 15.2%. Banks and Mississippi credit unions in particular 
saw an increase in ROA, but New Orleans credit unions had negative 
ROA growth.
A comparison of the top 10 observations of ROA versus the bottom 
10 reveals that overall, credit unions were in the top 10 according 
to their percentage in the sample, but were overrepresented in the 
bottom 10, as expected given the situation in New Orleans discussed 
above (see Figure 6). Th e top 10 observations had higher growth in 
assets and higher growth in potential credit union members.
Figure 8 shows regressions with asset growth one year after 
Katrina. Employee growth is consistently estimated to be cor-
related with asset growth in the four speciﬁ cations listed. Larger 
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Sample total 1,437,384 1,568,660 9.1
Mississippi 1,273,537 1,420,829 11.6
New Orleans 163,847 147,831 –9.8
Mississippi, low income 50,850 50,850 0.0
New Orleans, low income 49,495 36,250 –26.8
Figure 5: Number of Potential Credit Union Members
11 Only the fi ve respondents who gave precise estimates of damage were used in this estimate. Others indicated that they had signifi cant 
damage but did not offer an exact fi gure.
Th e top 10 observations had higher growth in assets and 
higher growth in potential credit union members.
Chapter 3
14
ﬁ rms are associated with quicker growth, even though three ﬁ rms 
were dropped as outliers for analysis here because of their large 
size relative to the total sample.12 Credit unions are insigniﬁ cantly 
diﬀ erent relative to commercial banks. Th e age of the institu-
tion also appears to be unimportant, and the overall explanatory 
power of these speciﬁ cations is low.
Variable
Top 10
institutions
Bottom 10 
institutions
Institutions 
overall
ROA 2.86 –2.90 0.862
Percent credit unions 60 80 64
Percent low-income credit unions 30 30 65
Percent in Mississippi 60 10 47
Age of institution 42 53 53
Change in number of employees
(May 2005–May 2006)
–7% –16% –0.07%
Change in assets 22% –0.1% 0.159%
Change in number of members
(credit unions only)
–2.8% –9.1% –2.8%
Change in number of potential
members (credit unions only)
2.0% –14.2% –3.8%
Membership as a percentage of poten-
tial membership (credit unions only) 
58% 60.2% 58%
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
ROA 1.02 0.86 –15.2
Banks 1.19 1.35 14.2
Credit unions 0.92 0.58 –37.3
Mississippi
Banks 1.34 1.46 8.8
Credit unions 0.72 1.50 107.4
Low-income credit unions 0.73 1.92 162.0
New Orleans
Banks 1.01 1.23 22.3
Credit unions 1.06 0.08 –107.6
Low-income credit unions 1.09 –0.70 –164.1
Figure 6: Comparison of the Top 10 Observations of ROA 
versus the Bottom 10 for 2006
Figure 7: Credit Union and Bank ROA (Percent)
12 Quite a few of the offi ces of these three institutions were not in the impacted area—e.g., Capital One, with assets over $29B.
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Th e regressions for variations in ROA (see Figure 10) have less 
explanatory power than those for asset growth. Size does help 
increase returns, as indicated by the positive and signiﬁ cant coef-
ﬁ cient on assets. Th is ﬁ nding is similar to those of Fried and Lovell 
(1993) and Kohers and Mullis (1988) on the eﬃ  ciency of larger 
institutions. Th e negative impact of the storm is partially caught by 
the time dummy’s negative sign, but it is not statistically signiﬁ cant. 
Being a credit union and being in Mississippi are both consistently 
Asset growth 
(1)
Asset growth 
(2)
Asset growth 
(3)
Asset growth 
(4)
Employee growth 0.26**
 (3.25)
0.20**
(3.38)
0.27**
(3.36)
0.16*
(2.30)
Size (assets in May 2005) 0.00
(0.96)
0.00
(1.14)
0.00
(1.07)
0.00
(1.10)
Credit union dummy 0.01
(0.24)
0.01
(0.18)
–0.12
(0.25)
Age of institution –0.00
(1.11)
–0.00
(1.09)
0.00
(0.50)
Age of institution squared 0.00
(0.78)
N 74 74 74 74
Adjusted R-sq 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.11
Figure 8: Asset Growth of Financial Institutions Aﬀ ected by 
Katrina, One Year Later 
Dependent variable is asset growth. Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
* indicates signifi cance at the 5% level.
** indicates signifi cance at the 10% level.
May 31, 2005 May 31, 2006
Percentage 
change
Assets of U.S. banks (year-end) $10,877.3B $11,860.2B 9.0
Number of commercial U.S. banks 
(year-end)
8,833 8,681 –1.7
Assets of U.S. credit unions (April) $693.2B $716.8B 3.4
Number of U.S. credit unions (April) 9,251 8,900 –3.8
Number of U.S. credit union members 
(April)
86.9 million 87.9 million 1.1
National GDP (fi rst quarter)* $10,999.3B $11,394.7B 3.6
Mississippi gross state product* $68,830B $69,672B 1.2
Louisiana gross state product $137,524 $135,362 –1.6
Figure 9: Credit Union, Bank, and GDP Information
* 2000 dollars.
Sources: FDIC 2007; CUNA 2006; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2006.
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estimated to have a positive but insigniﬁ cant impact on returns. 
Being federally chartered also does not appear to be signiﬁ cant, nor 
does the age of the institution.
A measure of eﬃ  ciency similar to output per person—assets per 
employee—is used in Figure 11 to try to discern sources of perfor-
mance strengths and weaknesses. Th is set of regressions has the most 
clarifying strength of any set explored, evidenced by a much higher 
adjusted R-square of around 0.54. Average assets per employee in 
the sample are just over $2.7M in 2006, about a 25% increase from 
2005. Th e large increase in assets mentioned earlier over this period 
seems to be better handled by larger institutions. Th e scale variable 
(natural logarithm of assets) is measured as having a positive and 
signiﬁ cant impact in Figure 11. Given the growth of assets over this 
period, which is signiﬁ cantly greater than that of employment, it is 
no surprise that the time dummy is also estimated as positive and 
signiﬁ cant.
Credit unions are estimated here to be quite a bit more eﬃ  cient in 
the use of employees than are banks. Th e credit union dummy is 
estimated to be quite strong and signiﬁ cant across all speciﬁ cations in 
Figure 11. In fact, the evidence from these regressions, the strongest 
in statistical terms, shows that once you hold constant other fac-
tors such as size and age, each credit union employee handles about 
Return on 
assets (1)
Return on 
assets (2)
Return on 
assets (3)
Return on 
assets (4)
Ln(Assets) 0.003*
(2.77)
0.003*
(2.55)
0.003*
(2.44)
0.003*
(2.44)
Time dummy (1 if 2006) –0.002
(0.67)
–0.002
(0.66)
–0.002
(0.66)
–0.002
(0.66)
Credit union dummy 0.005
(0.99)
0.005
(0.96)
0.005
(0.95)
0. 005
(0.94)
Mississippi dummy 0.004
(1.04)
0.004
(1.03)
0.004
(1.04)
Federal charter dummy –0.08
(0.73)
–0.05
(0.43)
Age of institution 0.003
(0.25)
N 147 147 147 147
Adjusted R-sq 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03
Figure 10: Eﬃ  ciency Measure of ROA
Dependent variable is the natural log of ROA. Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
Net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a percentage of average total assets (FDIC 2007; NCUA 2005).
* indicates signifi cance at the 1% level.
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$750,000 more in assets per year than their bank counterparts.13 
Th is handling of a larger amount of assets with fewer employees is 
an important source of cost savings. One possible explanation for 
this increased eﬃ  ciency is that the average credit union member uses 
electronic services more often than the average bank customer. Th is 
could be because credit union members feel that their transactions 
are secure more than bank customers do, or because credit union 
members are more sophisticated users of technology in general. 
Another possible explanation, often seen in cooperative ﬁ rms, is that 
because credit union employees identify so strongly with the goals 
of the ﬁ rm, a smaller managerial staﬀ  is needed to monitor these 
employees. Th e highly successful credit unions and companies of 
the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation, for instance, are widely 
believed to gain high levels of eﬃ  ciency partly because of higher 
morale and less supervisory staﬀ  per worker.14
A Mississippi location, a federal charter, and the age of the institu-
tion show no statistical explanatory power in any of the speciﬁ cations 
in Figure 11.
Assets per 
employee (1)
Assets per 
employee (2)
Assets per 
employee (3)
Assets per 
employee (4)
Ln(Assets) 0.33*
(10.97)
0.33*
(11.08)
0.33*
(10.51)
0.32*
(10.50)
Time dummy (1 if 2006) 0.19**
(2.12)
0.19**
(2.12)
0.19**
(2.12)
0.19**
(2.13)
Credit union dummy 0.42*
(3.14)
0.43*
(3.19)
0.45*
(3.27)
0.45*
(3.29)
Mississippi dummy –0.12
(1.38)
–0.12
(1.28)
–0.12
(1.35)
Federal charter dummy –0.08
(0.73)
–0.05
(0.43)
Age of institution 0.003
(1.58)
N 147 147 147 147
Adjusted R-sq 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.55
Figure 11: Eﬃ  ciency Measure of Assets per Employee
Dependent variable is the natural log of assets per employee. Absolute values of t-ratios are in parentheses.
* indicates signifi cance at the 1% level.
** indicates signifi cance at the 5% level.
13 To be precise, the estimate is $749,785 more per employee per year. This estimate was made at the mean of the sample.
14 See the Mondragon Web site (www.mcc.es/ing/index.asp) for current information. Additionally, Whyte and Whyte (1991) is a classic book on 
Mondragon’s success.
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Policy Implications and Future Research
Extended social and physical networks are 
diﬃ  cult to quantify, but their presence in the 
 post- Katrina environment clearly made the 
diﬀ erence for a number of institutions.
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Credit unions and banks suﬀ ered enormous losses through physical 
damage, the loss of surrounding businesses, and employee personal 
losses following Katrina. Because the credit unions based in the sample 
area were greater in number and tended to cater more to  lower- income 
groups, they suﬀ ered more closures, movements out of the area, and 
mergers (16 out of 63  pre- Katrina credit unions). Th ese losses were 
almost entirely in the New Orleans area. Banks gained employees in 
the year following Katrina, while credit unions lost about 4% of their 
workforce. Assets in the year following Katrina grew for both banks and 
credit unions by about 27%. Th is surge in assets was much greater than 
the national average for both types of institutions (9% for banks and 
3.4% for credit unions). Th e likely explanation for this large increase 
in assets following such devastation is the collection of insurance funds 
and aid prior to the expenditure of those funds for rebuilding.
Heartening evidence of the resilience of credit unions is seen in the 
2.6% growth in membership in the year after the storm. Mississippi 
credit unions were responsible for this growth, partly because much 
of that region is on higher ground and absorbed a large number of 
displaced people from  harder- hit areas. Th e ROA in the area showed a 
decline of 15.2%, but most of that decline is attributable to the New 
Orleans credit unions, especially the  low- income ones.
Th e regression analysis shows that asset growth was positively correlated 
with larger institutions and employee growth. Whether the institution 
was a bank or a credit union and the age of the ﬁ rm were insigniﬁ -
cant in explaining variations in asset growth. Results in the regression 
analysis for ROA are weaker in explanatory power than those for assets, 
but they show again that larger institutions had higher returns. Being 
in Mississippi and being a credit union are positively correlated with 
higher returns but statistically insigniﬁ cant. Th e analysis of eﬃ  ciency in 
terms of assets per employee shows again that size is important. Signiﬁ -
cantly, credit unions seem to be able to handle more assets per employee 
than banks. Th e regression analysis on assets per employee is much 
more powerful in explanatory power than other performance measures.
It is clear from anecdotal evidence and ﬁ ndings from the survey that 
credit unions obtained signiﬁ cant support from other credit unions 
locally and across the nation. Th e damage to the institutions and to 
customer and employee homes, along with the psychological wounds 
from such a profound disaster, means that the ﬁ rms that come back 
must oﬀ er a wide array of support services. Th e need for nongovern-
ment support networks was made clear in the wake of Katrina, espe-
cially with the slow response of the federal government.  Post- Katrina 
planning for disaster in the areas impacted by the storm typically 
stresses redundancy in communications and ﬁ nancial resources.15 
Communications redundancy can be achieved by having cell phones, 
generators, partnerships or agreements with other institutions, satel-
lite phones,  walkie- talkies, e-mail  oﬀ - site with a list of contacts to get 
information out to, and so forth. Financial resource redundancy is 
seen in the increased use by credit unions of shared branching (see, 
for example, Liberto 2006) and partnership agreements with other 
credit unions in diverse geographical areas. Th ese extended social and 
physical networks are diﬃ  cult to quantify, but their presence in the 
 post- Katrina environment clearly made the diﬀ erence for a number 
of institutions. Banks with branches outside the aﬀ ected areas could 
rely on the resources of the untouched branches to help them out. 
National and local credit union associations provided volunteers, 
cash, and managerial help during this crucial time (Elliott 2005).
PEOPLE HELPING PEOPLE
According to Charles Elliott, president and 
CEO of the Mississippi Credit Union Asso-
ciation, a credit union on the coast that 
had been severely damaged in the storm 
and was unable to offer services through 
its regular outlets had an armed manager 
hand out cash from the back of a pickup 
truck. Once the manager had helped those 
he could at his own credit union, he went 
on to help another credit union in a similar 
fashion. The courage and heroism that 
often arise in diffi cult situations like these 
was shown over and over again on the 
coast, but the solidarity that credit unions 
showed—as people helping people—was 
extraordinary.
Chapter 4 21
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Th e credit unions, banks, and other businesses in the storm area 
still have much work ahead of them. High insurance and land costs 
mean that many businesses and homeowners may never rebuild.16 
Th e further development of ties between ﬁ rms means that if another 
disaster hits this area, ﬁ nancial institutions, especially credit unions, 
will be better prepared. Th e strength of cooperative networks and 
the loyalty of employees and members have helped bring many ﬁ rms 
back, and the development of better disaster plans makes a repeat of 
the diﬃ  cult  post- Katrina days much less likely.
16  Oreck Corporation left the Mississippi Gulf Coast after doing heroic work to help employees. For a recent summary, see Elliott 2007.
Communications redundancy can be achieved by having cell phones, generators, part-
nerships or agreements with other institutions, satellite phones,  walkie- talkies, e-mail 
 oﬀ - site with a list of contacts to get information out to, and so forth.
Appendix
Data Collection
Data were collected from online sources and from credit union and 
bank presidents and staﬀ  through interviews and a survey. Altogether, 
direct contact was made with about 20% of the total population of 
surviving ﬁ nancial institutions. Th e survey consisted of 17 questions 
about storm damage, volunteer hours, sources of aid, and number of 
employees, among other things. Th e survey was e-mailed or  hand-
 delivered to institutions; the credit union leagues of Louisiana and 
Mississippi helped in its distribution.
Some sample selection bias is likely, given that some of the institu-
tions are small and did not have e-mail addresses, and many very 
large institutions did not respond. Th e survey was kept short to 
encourage responses. Th e only survey responses came from credit 
unions, but the survey provided a basis for  on- site interviews, and 
the  open- ended question at the end was helpful for understand-
ing a number of new developments. Th e survey was supplemented 
by data gathered from online sources (e.g., the Federal Reserve and 
CUNA). Th ese online sources gave detailed ﬁ nancial information 
and  macroeconomic conditions for the region. Th e sample used here 
includes the total population of credit unions and banks in New 
Orleans and in the 12 counties of southern Mississippi that were hit 
hard by the storm. Banks are usually much larger than credit unions; 
in fact, there were two banks (not in the current sample) with assets 
in 2005 of over a trillion dollars, more than all U.S. credit unions 
combined.
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 1. Employees as of May 2005:
 2. Employees as of May 2006:
 3. Assets as of May 2005:
 4. Assets as of May 2006:
 5. Customers as of May 2005:
 6. Customers as of May 2006:
 7. Branches as of May 2005:
 8. Branches as of May 2006:
 9. ATMs as of May 2005:
10. ATMs as of May 2006:
11. Estimated volunteer hours, September 1, 2005, until June 1, 2006:
12. Estimated storm damage in dollars:
13. Aid (tax relief, etc.) from federal sources, September 1, 2005, until June 1, 2006:
14. Aid (tax relief, etc.) from state sources, September 1, 2005, until June 1, 2006:
15. Aid (tax relief, etc.) from local sources, September 1, 2005, until June 1, 2006:
16. Aid (tax relief, etc.) from organizational sources (corporate, professional association, etc.), 
September 1, 2005, until June 1, 2006:
17. Other factors and comments:
SURVEY
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